Search Results

Documents authored by Alagic, Gorjan

Document
DOI: 10.4230/DagRep.13.10.65
Quantum Cryptanalysis (Dagstuhl Seminar 23421)

Authors: Gorjan Alagic, Maria Naya-Plasencia, Rainer Steinwandt, and Manasi Shingane

Published in: Dagstuhl Reports, Volume 13, Issue 10 (2024)

Abstract
This report documents the program and the outcomes of Dagstuhl Seminar 23421 "Quantum Cryptanalysis". The seminar took place as an in-person event in October 2023 and was the seventh installment of the Dagstuhl Seminar series on Quantum Cryptanalysis. This report describes the motivation and technical scope of the seminar as well as the (updated) organizational structure of this week-long event. We also include abstracts of the seminar presentations given by participants and a description of the activities of the working groups.
Cite as

Gorjan Alagic, Maria Naya-Plasencia, Rainer Steinwandt, and Manasi Shingane. Quantum Cryptanalysis (Dagstuhl Seminar 23421). In Dagstuhl Reports, Volume 13, Issue 10, pp. 65-75, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2024)

Copy BibTex To Clipboard

@Article{alagic_et_al:DagRep.13.10.65,
  author =	{Alagic, Gorjan and Naya-Plasencia, Maria and Steinwandt, Rainer and Shingane, Manasi},
  title =	{{Quantum Cryptanalysis (Dagstuhl Seminar 23421)}},
  pages =	{65--75},
  journal =	{Dagstuhl Reports},
  ISSN =	{2192-5283},
  year =	{2024},
  volume =	{13},
  number =	{10},
  editor =	{Alagic, Gorjan and Naya-Plasencia, Maria and Steinwandt, Rainer and Shingane, Manasi},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/DagRep.13.10.65},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-198345},
  doi =		{10.4230/DagRep.13.10.65},
  annote =	{Keywords: computational algebra, cryptanalysis, post-quantum cryptography, quantum algorithms, quantum resource estimation}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.TQC.2019.1
On Quantum Chosen-Ciphertext Attacks and Learning with Errors

Authors: Gorjan Alagic, Stacey Jeffery, Maris Ozols, and Alexander Poremba

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 135, 14th Conference on the Theory of Quantum Computation, Communication and Cryptography (TQC 2019)

Abstract
Quantum computing is a significant threat to classical public-key cryptography. In strong "quantum access" security models, numerous symmetric-key cryptosystems are also vulnerable. We consider classical encryption in a model which grants the adversary quantum oracle access to encryption and decryption, but where the latter is restricted to non-adaptive (i.e., pre-challenge) queries only. We define this model formally using appropriate notions of ciphertext indistinguishability and semantic security (which are equivalent by standard arguments) and call it QCCA1 in analogy to the classical CCA1 security model. Using a bound on quantum random-access codes, we show that the standard PRF-based encryption schemes are QCCA1-secure when instantiated with quantum-secure primitives. We then revisit standard IND-CPA-secure Learning with Errors (LWE) encryption and show that leaking just one quantum decryption query (and no other queries or leakage of any kind) allows the adversary to recover the full secret key with constant success probability. In the classical setting, by contrast, recovering the key requires a linear number of decryption queries. The algorithm at the core of our attack is a (large-modulus version of) the well-known Bernstein-Vazirani algorithm. We emphasize that our results should not be interpreted as a weakness of these cryptosystems in their stated security setting (i.e., post-quantum chosen-plaintext secrecy). Rather, our results mean that, if these cryptosystems are exposed to chosen-ciphertext attacks (e.g., as a result of deployment in an inappropriate real-world setting) then quantum attacks are even more devastating than classical ones.
Cite as

Gorjan Alagic, Stacey Jeffery, Maris Ozols, and Alexander Poremba. On Quantum Chosen-Ciphertext Attacks and Learning with Errors. In 14th Conference on the Theory of Quantum Computation, Communication and Cryptography (TQC 2019). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 135, pp. 1:1-1:23, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2019)

Copy BibTex To Clipboard

@InProceedings{alagic_et_al:LIPIcs.TQC.2019.1,
  author =	{Alagic, Gorjan and Jeffery, Stacey and Ozols, Maris and Poremba, Alexander},
  title =	{{On Quantum Chosen-Ciphertext Attacks and Learning with Errors}},
  booktitle =	{14th Conference on the Theory of Quantum Computation, Communication and Cryptography (TQC 2019)},
  pages =	{1:1--1:23},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-112-2},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2019},
  volume =	{135},
  editor =	{van Dam, Wim and Man\v{c}inska, Laura},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops-dev.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.TQC.2019.1},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-103939},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.TQC.2019.1},
  annote =	{Keywords: quantum chosen-ciphertext security, quantum attacks, learning with errors}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.TQC.2014.141
Circuit Obfuscation Using Braids

Authors: Gorjan Alagic, Stacey Jeffery, and Stephen Jordan

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 27, 9th Conference on the Theory of Quantum Computation, Communication and Cryptography (TQC 2014)

Abstract
An obfuscator is an algorithm that translates circuits into functionally-equivalent similarly-sized circuits that are hard to understand. Efficient obfuscators would have many applications in cryptography. Until recently, theoretical progress has mainly been limited to no-go results. Recent works have proposed the first efficient obfuscation algorithms for classical logic circuits, based on a notion of indistinguishability against polynomial-time adversaries. In this work, we propose a new notion of obfuscation, which we call partial-indistinguishability. This notion is based on computationally universal groups with efficiently computable normal forms, and appears to be incomparable with existing definitions. We describe universal gate sets for both classical and quantum computation, in which our definition of obfuscation can be met by polynomial-time algorithms. We also discuss some potential applications to testing quantum computers. We stress that the cryptographic security of these obfuscators, especially when composed with translation from other gate sets, remains an open question.
Cite as

Gorjan Alagic, Stacey Jeffery, and Stephen Jordan. Circuit Obfuscation Using Braids. In 9th Conference on the Theory of Quantum Computation, Communication and Cryptography (TQC 2014). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 27, pp. 141-160, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2014)

Copy BibTex To Clipboard

@InProceedings{alagic_et_al:LIPIcs.TQC.2014.141,
  author =	{Alagic, Gorjan and Jeffery, Stacey and Jordan, Stephen},
  title =	{{Circuit Obfuscation Using Braids}},
  booktitle =	{9th Conference on the Theory of Quantum Computation, Communication and Cryptography (TQC 2014)},
  pages =	{141--160},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-939897-73-6},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2014},
  volume =	{27},
  editor =	{Flammia, Steven T. and Harrow, Aram W.},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops-dev.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.TQC.2014.141},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-48135},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.TQC.2014.141},
  annote =	{Keywords: obfuscation, cryptography, universality, quantum}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.TQC.2014.161
Classical Simulation of Yang-Baxter Gates

Authors: Gorjan Alagic, Aniruddha Bapat, and Stephen Jordan

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 27, 9th Conference on the Theory of Quantum Computation, Communication and Cryptography (TQC 2014)

Abstract
A unitary operator that satisfies the constant Yang-Baxter equation immediately yields a unitary representation of the braid group B_n for every n >= 2. If we view such an operator as a quantum-computational gate, then topological braiding corresponds to a quantum circuit. A basic question is when such a representation affords universal quantum computation. In this work, we show how to classically simulate these circuits when the gate in question belongs to certain families of solutions to the Yang-Baxter equation. These include all of the qubit (i.e., d = 2) solutions, and some simple families that include solutions for arbitrary d >= 2. Our main tool is a probabilistic classical algorithm for efficient simulation of a more general class of quantum circuits. This algorithm may be of use outside the present setting.
Cite as

Gorjan Alagic, Aniruddha Bapat, and Stephen Jordan. Classical Simulation of Yang-Baxter Gates. In 9th Conference on the Theory of Quantum Computation, Communication and Cryptography (TQC 2014). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 27, pp. 161-175, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2014)

Copy BibTex To Clipboard

@InProceedings{alagic_et_al:LIPIcs.TQC.2014.161,
  author =	{Alagic, Gorjan and Bapat, Aniruddha and Jordan, Stephen},
  title =	{{Classical Simulation of Yang-Baxter Gates}},
  booktitle =	{9th Conference on the Theory of Quantum Computation, Communication and Cryptography (TQC 2014)},
  pages =	{161--175},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-939897-73-6},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2014},
  volume =	{27},
  editor =	{Flammia, Steven T. and Harrow, Aram W.},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops-dev.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.TQC.2014.161},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-48143},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.TQC.2014.161},
  annote =	{Keywords: Quantum, Yang-Baxter, Braid, Anyon}
}
Questions / Remarks / Feedback
X

Feedback for Dagstuhl Publishing


Thanks for your feedback!

Feedback submitted

Could not send message

Please try again later or send an E-mail
© 2023-2024 Schloss Dagstuhl – LZI GmbH Imprint Privacy Contact